Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science
D6. Advanced Concepts in Predicate Logic and Outlook

Malte Helmert, Gabriele Röger

University of Basel

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Free and Bound Variables

Free and Bound Variables: Motivation

Question:

- Consider a signature with variable symbols $\{x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots\}$ and an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$.
- Which parts of the definition of α are relevant to decide whether $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models (\forall x_4(R(x_4, x_2) \vee (f(x_3) = x_4)) \vee \exists x_3 S(x_3, x_2))$?
- $\alpha(x_1)$, $\alpha(x_5)$, $\alpha(x_6)$, $\alpha(x_7)$, ... are irrelevant since those variable symbols occur in no formula.
- $\alpha(x_4)$ also is irrelevant: the variable occurs in the formula, but all occurrences are bound by a surrounding quantifier.
- $\rightsquigarrow$ only assignments for free variables x_2 and x_3 relevant

German: gebundene und freie Variablen

Variables of a Term

Definition (Variables of a Term)

Let t be a term. The set of variables that occur in t, written as $var(t)$, is defined as follows:

- $var(x) = \{x\}$
  for variable symbols x
- $var(c) = \emptyset$
  for constant symbols c
- $var(f(t_1, \ldots, t_k)) = var(t_1) \cup \cdots \cup var(t_k)$
  for function terms

terminology: A term t with $var(t) = \emptyset$ is called ground term.
German: Grundterm

example: $var(\text{product}(x, \text{sum}(k, y))) =$

Free and Bound Variables of a Formula

Definition (Free Variables)

Let φ be a predicate logic formula. The set of free variables of φ, written as $free(\varphi)$, is defined as follows:

- $free(\mathrm{P}(t_1, \ldots, t_k)) = var(t_1) \cup \cdots \cup var(t_k)$
- $free((t_1 = t_2)) = var(t_1) \cup var(t_2)$
- $free(\neg\varphi) = free(\varphi)$
- $free((\varphi \wedge \psi)) = free((\varphi \vee \psi)) = free(\varphi) \cup free(\psi)$
- $free(\forall x \, \varphi) = free(\exists x \, \varphi) = free(\varphi) \setminus \{x\}$

Example: $free((\forall x_4(\mathrm{R}(x_4, x_2) \vee (\mathrm{f}(x_3) = x_4)) \vee \exists x_3 \mathrm{S}(x_3, x_2)))$
$=$

Closed Formulas/Sentences

Note: Let φ be a formula and let α and β variable assignments with $\alpha(x) = \beta(x)$ for all free variables x of φ.

Then $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$ iff $\mathcal{I}, \beta \models \varphi$.

In particular, α is completely irrelevant if $\mathit{free}(\varphi) = \emptyset$.

Definition (Closed Formulas/Sentences)

A formula φ without free variables (i. e., $\mathit{free}(\varphi) = \emptyset$) is called closed formula or sentence.

If φ is a sentence, then we often write $\mathcal{I} \models \varphi$ instead of $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$, since the definition of α does not influence whether φ is true under $\mathcal{I}$ and α or not.

Formulas with at least one free variable are called open.

Closed formulas with no quantifiers are called ground formulas.

German: geschlossene Formel/Satz, offene Formel, Grundformel/variablenfreie Formel

Closed Formulas/Sentences: Examples

Question: Which of the following formulas are sentences?

- $(\text{Block}(b) \lor \neg\text{Block}(b))$
- $(\text{Block}(x) \rightarrow (\text{Block}(x) \lor \neg\text{Block}(y)))$
- $(\text{Block}(a) \land \text{Block}(b))$
- $\forall x(\text{Block}(x) \rightarrow \text{Red}(x))$

Reasoning in Predicate Logic

Terminology for Formulas

The terminology we introduced for propositional logic equally applies to predicate logic:

- Interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ and variable assignment α form a model of the formula φ if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$.
- Formula φ is satisfiable if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$ for at least one $\mathcal{I}, \alpha$.
- Formula φ is falsifiable if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \not\models \varphi$. for at least one $\mathcal{I}, \alpha$
- Formula φ is valid if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$ for all $\mathcal{I}, \alpha$.
- Formula φ is unsatisfiable if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \not\models \varphi$ for all $\mathcal{I}, \alpha$.

German: Modell, erfüllbar, falsifizierbar, gültig, unerfüllbar

All concepts can be used for the special case of sentences. In this case we usually omit α. Examples:

- Interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of a sentence φ if $\mathcal{I} \models \varphi$.
- Sentence φ is unsatisfiable if $\mathcal{I} \not\models \varphi$ for all $\mathcal{I}$.

Sets of Formulas: Semantics

Definition (Satisfied/True Sets of Formulas)

Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a signature, Φ a set of formulas over $\mathcal{S}$,
$\mathcal{I}$ an interpretation for $\mathcal{S}$ and α a variable assignment for $\mathcal{S}$
and the universe of $\mathcal{I}$.

We say that $\mathcal{I}$ and α satisfy the formulas Φ
(also: Φ is true under $\mathcal{I}$ and α), written as: $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \Phi$,
if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$ for all $\varphi \in \Phi$.

German: $\mathcal{I}$ und α erfüllen Φ, Φ ist wahr unter $\mathcal{I}$ und α

We may again write $\mathcal{I} \models \Phi$ if all formulas in Φ are sentences.

Logical Equivalence and Logical Consequences

We again we use the same concepts and notations
as in propositional logic.

- A set of formulas Φ logically entails/implies formula ψ,
  written as $\Phi \models \psi$, if all models of Φ are models of ψ.

- For a single formula φ, we may write $\varphi \models \psi$ for $\{\varphi\} \models \psi$.

- Formulas φ and ψ are logically equivalent, written as $\varphi \equiv \psi$,
  if they have the same models.

    - Note that $\varphi \equiv \psi$ iff $\varphi \models \psi$ and $\psi \models \varphi$.

Important Theorems about Logical Consequences

Theorem (Deduction Theorem)

$KB \cup \{\varphi\} \models \psi$ *iff* $KB \models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$

German: Deduktionssatz

Theorem (Contraposition Theorem)

$KB \cup \{\varphi\} \models \neg\psi$ *iff* $KB \cup \{\psi\} \models \neg\varphi$

German: Kontrapositionssatz

Theorem (Contradiction Theorem)

$KB \cup \{\varphi\}$ *is unsatisfiable iff* $KB \models \neg\varphi$

German: Widerlegungssatz

These can be proved exactly the same way as in propositional logic.

Logical Equivalences

- All logical equivalences of propositional logic also hold in predicate logic (e. g., $(\varphi \vee \psi) \equiv (\psi \vee \varphi)$). (Why?)
- Additionally the following equivalences and implications hold:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(\forall x \varphi \wedge \forall x \psi) &\equiv \forall x (\varphi \wedge \psi) \\
(\forall x \varphi \vee \forall x \psi) &\models \forall x (\varphi \vee \psi) && \text{but not the converse} \\
(\forall x \varphi \wedge \psi) &\equiv \forall x (\varphi \wedge \psi) && \text{if } x \notin \text{free}(\psi) \\
(\forall x \varphi \vee \psi) &\equiv \forall x (\varphi \vee \psi) && \text{if } x \notin \text{free}(\psi) \\
\neg \forall x \varphi &\equiv \exists x \neg \varphi \\
\exists x (\varphi \vee \psi) &\equiv (\exists x \varphi \vee \exists x \psi) \\
\exists x (\varphi \wedge \psi) &\models (\exists x \varphi \wedge \exists x \psi) && \text{but not the converse} \\
(\exists x \varphi \vee \psi) &\equiv \exists x (\varphi \vee \psi) && \text{if } x \notin \text{free}(\psi) \\
(\exists x \varphi \wedge \psi) &\equiv \exists x (\varphi \wedge \psi) && \text{if } x \notin \text{free}(\psi) \\
\neg \exists x \varphi &\equiv \forall x \neg \varphi
\end{aligned}
$$

Normal Forms (1)

Analogously to DNF and CNF for propositional logic
there are several normal forms for predicate logic, such as

- negation normal form (NNF):
  negation symbols ($\neg$) are only allowed in front of atoms
  or identities

- prenex normal form:
  quantifiers must form the outermost part of the formula

- Skolem normal form:
  prenex normal form without existential quantifiers

German: Negationsnormalform, Pränexnormalform,
Skolemnormalform

Normal Forms (2)

Efficient methods transform formula φ

- into an equivalent formula in negation normal form,
- into an equivalent formula in prenex normal form, or
- into an equisatisfiable formula in Skolem normal form.

German: erfüllbarkeitsäquivalent

Inference Rules and Calculi

There exist correct and complete proof systems (calculi) for predicate logic.

- An example is the natural deduction calculus.
- This is (essentially) Gödel's Completeness Theorem (1929).
- However, one can show that correct and complete algorithms that prove that a given formula does not follow from a given set of formulas cannot exist.
- How are these statements reconcilable?

Summary and Outlook

Summary

- **Predicate logic** is more expressive than propositional logic and allows statements over **objects** and their **properties**.
- Objects are described by **terms** that are built from variable, constant and function symbols.
- Properties and relations are described by **formulas** that are built from predicates, quantifiers and the usual logical operators.
- **Bound** vs. **free** variables: to decide if $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$, only free variables in α matter
- **Sentences** (closed formulas): formulas without free variables

Summary

Once the basic definitions are in place, predicate logic
can be developed in the same way as propositional logic:

- logical consequence
- deduction theorem etc.
- logical equivalences
- normal forms
- inference rules, proof systems, resolution

Other Logics (1)

- We considered first-order predicate logic.
- Second-order predicate logic allows quantifying over predicate symbols.
- There are intermediate steps, e. g., monadic second-order logic (all quantified predicates are unary) and description logics (foundation of the semantic web).

Second-Order Logic Example

Second-order logic example:

- "T is the transitive closure of R"
- conjunction of
    - $\forall x \forall y (R(x, y) \rightarrow T(x, y))$
      "T is a superset of R"
    - $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((T(x, y) \land T(y, z)) \rightarrow T(x, z))$
      "T is transitive"
    - $\forall Q ((\forall x \forall y (R(x, y) \rightarrow Q(x, y)) \land$
      $\quad \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Q(x, y) \land Q(y, z)) \rightarrow Q(x, z)))$
      $\quad \rightarrow \forall x \forall y (T(x, y) \rightarrow Q(x, y))))$
      "All supersets Q of R that are transitive are supersets of T"
- impossible to express in first-order logic

Other Logics (2)

- Modal logics have new operators $\Box$ and $\Diamond$.
    - classical meaning: $\Box\varphi$ for "φ is necessary",
      $\Diamond\varphi$ for "φ is possible".
    - temporal logic: $\Box\varphi$ for "φ is always true in the future",
      $\Diamond\varphi$ for "φ is true at some point in the future"
    - epistemic logic: $\Box\varphi$ for "φ is known",
      $\Diamond\varphi$ for "φ is possible"
    - doxastic logic: $\Box\varphi$ for "φ is believed",
      $\Diamond\varphi$ for "φ is considered possible"
    - deontic logic: $\Box\varphi$ for "φ is obligatory",
      $\Diamond\varphi$ for "φ is permitted"
    - ...
- very important in computer-aided verification

Other Logics (3)

- In fuzzy logic, formulas are not true or false but have values between 0 and 1.
- Intuitionist logic is "constructive" and excludes indirect proof methods such as the principle of the excluded third.
- Non-monotonic logics have rules with exceptions (e.g., default logic, cumulative logic).
- ... and there is a lot more