

Planning and Optimization

C3. Delete Relaxation: AND/OR Graphs

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Motivation

- Our next goal is to devise efficiently computable heuristics based on delete relaxation.
- The heuristics we will consider can all be understood in terms of computations on graphical structures called **AND/OR graphs**.
- In this chapter, we introduce AND/OR graphs and study some of their major properties.
- In the next chapter, we will relate AND/OR graphs to relaxed planning tasks.

AND/OR Graphs

AND/OR Graphs

Definition (AND/OR Graph)


An **AND/OR graph** $\langle N, A, type \rangle$ is a directed graph $\langle N, A \rangle$ with a node label function $type : N \rightarrow \{\wedge, \vee\}$ partitioning nodes into

- **AND nodes** ($type(v) = \wedge$) and
- **OR nodes** ($type(v) = \vee$).

We write $succ(n)$ for the successors of node $n \in N$, i.e.,
 $succ(n) = \{n' \in N \mid \langle n, n' \rangle \in A\}$.

Note: We draw AND nodes as squares and OR nodes as circles.

AND/OR Graph Example



AND/OR Graph Valuations

Definition (Consistent Valuations of AND/OR Graphs)

Let G be an AND/OR graph with nodes N .


A **valuation** or **truth assignment** of G is a valuation $\alpha : N \rightarrow \{\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}\}$, treating the nodes as propositional variables.

We say that α is **consistent** if


- for all AND nodes $n \in N$: $\alpha \models n$ iff $\alpha \models \bigwedge_{n' \in \text{succ}(n)} n'$.
- for all OR nodes $n \in N$: $\alpha \models n$ iff $\alpha \models \bigvee_{n' \in \text{succ}(n)} n'$.

Note that $\bigwedge_{n' \in \emptyset} n' = \top$ and $\bigvee_{n' \in \emptyset} n' = \perp$.


Example: A Consistent Valuation




Example: Another Consistent Valuation



Example: An Inconsistent Valuation



Example: An Inconsistent Valuation



Forced Nodes

How Do We Find Consistent Valuations?

If we want to use valuations of AND/OR graphs algorithmically, a number of questions arise:

- Do consistent valuations **exist** for every AND/OR graph?
- Are they **unique**?
- If not, how are different consistent valuations **related**?
- Can consistent valuations be **computed efficiently**?

Some Partial Answers

- We already know from our previous example that consistent valuations are in general not unique.
- We will now study two special kinds of valuations:
 - the **most conservative** valuation
 - the **least conservative** valuation
- We show that these two valuations **are always consistent** and can be computed efficiently.
- We also show that all consistent valuations lie **“in between”** these two valuations.
- In particular, an AND/OR graph has a **unique** consistent valuation iff its most and least conservative valuation coincide.

Forced True Nodes

Definition (Forced True Nodes)

Let G be an AND/OR graph.

The set of nodes of G that are **forced true** is defined by finite application of the following rules:

- If n is an **AND** node where **all** successors are forced true, then n is forced true.
- If n is an **OR** node where **at least one** successor is forced true, then n is forced true.

Forced False Nodes


Definition (Forced False Nodes)

Let G be an AND/OR graph.


The set of nodes of G that are **forced false** is defined by finite application of the following rules:

- If n is an **AND** node where **at least one** successor is forced false, then n is forced false.
- If n is an **OR** node where **all** successors are forced false, then n is forced false.


Example: Forced Nodes




Example: Forced Nodes




Example: Forced Nodes




Example: Forced Nodes



Example: Forced Nodes



Example: Forced Nodes



Remarks on Forced Nodes

Notes:

- Forced nodes are well-defined because the rules defining them are monotonic.
- They can be computed in linear time in the size of the graph.
- There exists at least one forced true node iff the graph has an AND node without successors.
- There exists at least one forced false node iff the graph has an OR node without successors.

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations

Theorem

Let G be an AND/OR graph with nodes N .

*Let $N_{\mathbf{T}} \subseteq N$ be the forced true nodes of G ,
and let $N_{\mathbf{F}} \subseteq N$ be the forced false nodes of G .*

Let $\alpha : N \rightarrow \{\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}\}$ be a consistent valuation of G . Then:

- $\alpha(n) = \mathbf{T}$ for all $n \in N_{\mathbf{T}}$
- $\alpha(n) = \mathbf{F}$ for all $n \in N_{\mathbf{F}}$

This property explains why they are called **forced** nodes.

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations: Proof (1)

Proof.

We prove the property of **forced true** nodes.

The property of forced false nodes can be proved analogously.

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Proof by contradiction: assume that there is a consistent valuation α and a forced true node $n \in N_{\mathbf{T}}$ with $\alpha(n) \neq \mathbf{T}$, i.e., $\alpha(n) = \mathbf{F}$.

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Let $N_{\mathbf{T}} = \{n_1, \dots, n_k\}$, where the nodes are ordered in a way that matches a possible sequence of rule applications:

i.e., the i -th rule application derives that n_i is forced true.

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Let $N_{\mathbf{T}} = \{n_1, \dots, n_k\}$, where the nodes are ordered in a way that matches a possible sequence of rule applications: i.e., the i -th rule application derives that n_i is forced true.

Let n_i be the **first** node in the order with $\alpha(n_i) = \mathbf{F}$.

Hence, $\alpha(n_j) = \mathbf{T}$ for all $j < i$.

...

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations: Proof (2)

Proof (continued).

Case 1: n_i is an AND node.

In the i -th rule application, n_i is shown as forced true, so all its successors must have been shown as forced true in an earlier rule application.

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations: Proof (2)

Proof (continued).

Case 1: n_i is an AND node.

In the i -th rule application, n_i is shown as forced true, so all its successors must have been shown as forced true in an earlier rule application.

Hence all nodes in $\text{succ}(n_i)$ are of the form n_j with $j < i$. By the choice of n_i , we have $\alpha(n_j) = \mathbf{T}$ for all these nodes.

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations: Proof (2)

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Hence all nodes in $\text{succ}(n_i)$ are of the form n_j with $j < i$. By the choice of n_i , we have $\alpha(n_j) = \mathbf{T}$ for all these nodes.

We conclude $\alpha \not\models n_i$ and $\alpha \models \bigwedge_{n' \in \text{succ}(n_i)} n'$, which shows that α is not consistent: a contradiction. ...

Forced Nodes and Consistent Valuations: Proof (3)

Proof (continued).

Case 2: n_i is an OR node.

In the i -th rule application, n_i is shown as forced true, so at least one successor must have been shown as forced true in an earlier rule application.

Hence at least one node in $\text{succ}(n_i)$ is of the form n_j with $j < i$. By the choice of n_i , we have $\alpha(n_j) = \mathbf{T}$ for such nodes.

We conclude $\alpha \not\models n_i$ and $\alpha \models \bigvee_{n' \in \text{succ}(n_i)} n'$, which shows that α is not consistent: a contradiction. □

Most and Least Conservative Valuation

Most and Least Conservative Valuation

Definition (Most and Least Conservative Valuation)

Let G be an AND/OR graph with nodes N .

The **most conservative valuation** $\alpha_{\text{mcv}}^G : N \rightarrow \{\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}\}$ and the **least conservative valuation** $\alpha_{\text{lcv}}^G : N \rightarrow \{\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{F}\}$ of G are defined as:

$$\alpha_{\text{mcv}}^G(n) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{T} & \text{if } n \text{ is forced true} \\ \mathbf{F} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
$$\alpha_{\text{lcv}}^G(n) = \begin{cases} \mathbf{F} & \text{if } n \text{ is forced false} \\ \mathbf{T} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Most/Least Conservative Valuations are Consistent

Theorem

Let G be an AND/OR graph. Then:

- 1 α_{mcv}^G is consistent.
- 2 α_{lcv}^G is consistent.
- 3 For all consistent valuations α of G ,
 $on(\alpha_{\text{mcv}}^G) \subseteq on(\alpha) \subseteq on(\alpha_{\text{lcv}}^G)$.

It follows that:

- Consistent valuations always exist and can be efficiently computed.
- All consistent valuations lie between the most and least conservative one.
- There is a unique consistent valuation iff $\alpha_{\text{mcv}}^G = \alpha_{\text{lcv}}^G$, or equivalently iff each node is forced true or forced false.

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (1)

Proof.

We prove part 1. Part 2 is analogous, and part 3 follows directly from the previous result and the definitions of α_{mcv}^G and α_{lcv}^G .

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (1)

Proof.

We prove part 1. Part 2 is analogous, and part 3 follows directly from the previous result and the definitions of α_{mcv}^G and α_{lcv}^G .

To prove part 1, we must show that α_{mcv}^G satisfies the consistency condition for every node n . Consider any node n

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (2)

Proof (continued).

Case 1a: n is an AND node and n is forced true.

All successors of n are forced true.

(Otherwise n would not be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and all its successors to **T**,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (2)

Proof (continued).

Case 1a: n is an AND node and n is forced true.

All successors of n are forced true.

(Otherwise n would not be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and all its successors to **T**,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .

Case 1b: n is an AND node and n is not forced true.

At least one successor n' of n is not forced true.

(Otherwise n would be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and n' to false,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .

...

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (3)

Proof (continued).

Case 2a: n is an OR node and n is forced true.

At least one successor n' of n is forced true.

(Otherwise n would not be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and n' to true,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .

MCV/LCV are Consistent: Proof (3)

Proof (continued).

Case 2a: n is an OR node and n is forced true.

At least one successor n' of n is forced true.

(Otherwise n would not be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and n' to true,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .

Case 2b: n is an OR node and n is not forced true.

No successor of n is forced true.

(Otherwise n would be forced true.)

Then α_{mcv}^G maps n and all its successors to **F**,
satisfying the consistency condition for n .



Summary

- **AND/OR graphs** are directed graphs with **AND nodes** and **OR nodes**.
- We can assign **truth values** to AND/OR graph nodes.
- Such valuations are called **consistent** if they match the intuitive meaning of “AND” and “OR”.
- Consistent valuations always exist.
- Consistent valuations can be computed efficiently.
- All consistent valuations fall between two extremes:
 - the **most conservative valuation**, where only nodes that are **forced to be true** are true
 - the **least conservative valuation**, where all nodes that are **not forced to be false** are true